We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set X in a reflexive Banach space X and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of X. At each iteration, we choose an action from X , based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret, defined as the gap between the realized reward and the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging (or Follow the Regularized Leader) to our setting and obtain general upper bounds on the worst-case regret that subsume a wide range of results from the literature. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit anytime regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space S whose Radon-Nikodym derivatives are elements of L p (S) for some p > 1. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either the set S or the reward functions. We also prove a general lower bound on the worst-case regret for any online algorithm. We then apply these results to the problem of learning in repeated continuous two-player zero-sum games, in which players' strategy sets are compact metric spaces. In doing so, we first prove that if both players play a Hannan-consistent strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. We then show that, under mild assumptions, Dual Averaging on the (infinite-dimensional) space of probability distributions indeed achieves Hannan-consistency. Finally, we illustrate our results through numerical examples.
Introduction
Regret analysis is a general technique for designing and analyzing algorithms for sequential decision problems in adversarial or stochastic settings (Audibert and Bubeck, 2009; Bubeck and CesaBianchi, 2012) . Online learning algorithms have many applications, including in machine learning (Xiao, 2010) , portfolio optimization (Cover, 1991) , and online convex optimization (Hazan et al., 2007) . A particularly interesting role that regret plays manifests in the study of repeated play of finite games (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001) . It is well known, for example, that in a two-player zero-sum finite game, if both players play according to a Hannan-consistent strategy (Hannan, 1957) , their (marginal) empirical distributions of play almost surely converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) . Moreover, it can be shown that playing a strategy that achieves sublinear regret almost surely guarantees Hannan-consistency.
Regret Minimization on Reflexive Banach Spaces
Consider a sequential decision problem in which we are to choose a sequence (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) of actions from some feasible subset X of a reflexive Banach space X, and seek to maximize a sequence (u 1 (x 1 ), u 2 (x 2 ), . . . ) of rewards, where the u τ : X → R are elements of a given subset U ⊂ X * , with X * the dual space of X. We assume that x t , the action chosen at time t, may only depend on the sequence of previously observed reward vectors (u 1 , . . . , u t−1 ). We call any such algorithm an online algorithm. We consider the adversarial setting, i.e., we do not make any distributional assumptions on the rewards. In particular, they could be picked maliciously by some adversary.
The notion of regret is a standard measure of performance for such a sequential decision problem. For a sequence (u 1 , . . . , u t ) of reward vectors, and a sequence of decisions (x 1 , . . . , x t ) produced by an algorithm, the regret of the algorithm with respect to a (fixed) decision x ∈ X is the gap between the realized reward and the reward under x. In other words,
The worst-case regret is defined as
An algorithm is said to have sublinear regret if for any sequence (u t ) t≥1 in the set of admissible reward functions U, the worst-case regret grows sublinearly, i.e. lim sup t R t /t ≤ 0.
Example 1 (Finite Action Sets) Consider a finite action set S = {1, . . . , n}, let X = X * = R n , and let X = ∆ n−1 , the probability simplex in R n . In this case, a reward function on S is simply a vector u ∈ R n , such that the i-th element u i is the reward of action i. A choice x ∈ X corresponds to a randomization over the n discrete actions in S. This is the classic setting of many regretminimizing algorithms in the literature.
Example 2 (Online Optimization on Compact Metric Spaces) Let S be a compact metric space, and let µ be a finite measure on S. Consider the Hilbert Space X = X * = L 2 (S, µ) and let X = {x ∈ X : x ≥ 0 a.e., x 1 = 1}. The set S is again the set of feasible actions. A reward function is an L 2 -integrable function on S, and each choice x ∈ X corresponds to a probability distribution (absolutely continuous w.r.t. to µ) over the set of actions. We will further explore a more general variant of this problem in Section 3.
In this Section, we prove a general bound on the worst-case regret for the Dual Averaging method. Dual Averaging was introduced by Nesterov (2009) for (finite dimensional) convex optimization, and was since applied to the online learning setting, for example by Xiao (2010) . In the finite dimensional case, the method works by solving, at each iteration, the maximization problem
where h is a strongly convex regularizer defined on X ⊂ R n and (η t ) t≥0 is a sequence of learning rates. The regret analysis of the method relies on the duality between strong convexity and smoothness for a convex function and its conjugate (Nesterov, 2009 , Lemma 1), see also (Rockafellar, 1997, Theorem 26.3) . To generalize the Dual Averaging method to our Banach space setting, we first need an analogous duality result. We develop such a result in Theorem 4. In particular, we show that the correct notion of strong convexity in our setting is (uniform) essential strong convexity. Equipped with this duality result, we can analyze the regret of the Dual Averaging method and derive a general bound in Theorem 6.
Preliminaries
Let (X, · ) be a reflexive Banach space, and denote by · , · : X × X * → R the canonical pairing between X and its dual space X * , so that x, ξ := ξ(x) for all x ∈ X, ξ ∈ X * . By the effective domain of an extended real-valued function f : X → [−∞, +∞] we mean the set dom f = {x ∈ X : f (x) < +∞}. A function f is proper if f > −∞ and dom f is non-empty. The conjugate or Legendre-Fenchel transform of f is the function f * : X * → [−∞, +∞] given by
for all ξ ∈ X * . If f is proper, lower semicontinuous and convex, its subdifferential ∂f is the set-valued mapping ∂f (x) = ξ ∈ X * : f (y) ≥ f (x) + y − x, ξ for all y ∈ X . We define dom ∂f := {x ∈ X : ∂f (x) = ∅}. Let Γ denote the set of all convex, lower semicontinuous functions γ : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞] such that γ(0) = 0, and let
We now introduce the appropriate definitions of strong convexity, differentiability and smoothness for our setting. Some related results are reviewed in Appendix A.
Definition 1 (Essential strong convexity (Strömberg, 2011) ) A proper convex lower semicontinuous function f : X → (−∞, ∞] is essentially strongly convex if (i) f is strictly convex on every convex subset of dom ∂f (ii) (∂f ) −1 is locally bounded on its domain (iii) for every x 0 ∈ dom ∂f there exists ξ 0 ∈ X * and γ ∈ Γ U such that
If (5) holds with γ independent of x 0 , then f is said to be uniformly essentially strongly convex with modulus γ.
Definition 2 (Essential Fréchet differentiability (Strömberg, 2011) ) A proper convex lower semicontinuous function f :
is Fréchet differentiable on int dom f with Fréchet derivative D, and Df (x j ) * → ∞ for any sequence (x j ) j in int dom f converging to some boundary point of dom f .
If (6) holds with κ independent of x 0 , then f is said to be uniformly essentially strongly smooth with modulus κ.
We are now ready to give our main duality result: 
If, in addition,γ(r) := γ(r)/r is strictly increasing, then
In other words, Df * is uniformly continuous with modulus of continuity χ(r) =γ −1 (r/2).
(ii) f * is uniformly essentially smooth with modulus γ * .
1/κ * . In particular, with γ(r) = K 2 r 2 , Definition 1 becomes the classic definition of K-strong convexity, and (8) yields the result familiar from the finite-dimensional case that the gradient Df * is 1/K Lipschitz with respect to the dual norm (Nesterov, 2009 , Lemma 1).
Dual Averaging in Reflexive Banach Spaces
We call a proper convex function h : X → (−∞, +∞] a regularizer function on a set X ⊂ X if h is essentially strongly convex and dom h = X . We emphasize that we do not assume h to be Fréchet-differentiable. Definition 1 in conjunction with Lemma 29 implies that for any regularizer function h, the supremum of any function of the form · , ξ − h( · ) over X, where ξ ∈ X * , will be attained at a unique element of X , namely Dh * (ξ), the Fréchet gradient of h * at ξ.
The Dual Averaging method with regularizer h and a sequence of learning rates (η t ) t≥1 generates a sequence of decisions using the simple update rule:
where U t = t τ =1 u τ and U 0 := 0. The following theorem provides a general regret bound.
Theorem 6 (Dual Averaging Regret) Let h be a uniformly essentially strongly convex regularizer on X with modulus γ. Let (η t ) t≥1 be a positive non-increasing sequence of learning rates. Then, for any sequence of payoff functions (u t ) t≥1 in X * , the sequence of plays (x t ) t≥0 given by
ensures that
where h = inf x∈X h(x),γ(r) := γ(r)/r and η 0 := η 1 .
Note that it is possible to obtain a regret bound similar to (10) also in a continuous-time setting. In fact, following Kwon and Mertikopoulos (2014) , we derive the bound (10) by first proving a bound on a suitably defined notion of continuous-time regret, and then bounding the difference between the continuous-time and discrete-time regrets. This analysis is detailed in Appendix B.
Theorem 6 provides a bound on the regret R t (x) with respect to a particular choice x ∈ X . Recall that the worst-case regret is defined as R t := sup x∈X R t (x). In the finite-dimensional seting of Example 1 the set X is compact, so any continuous regularizer h will be bounded, and hence taking the supremum over x in (10) poses no issue. However, this is not the case in our general setting, as the regularizer may be unbounded on X . For instance, consider Example 2 with the entropy regularizer h(x) = S x(s) log(x(s))ds, which is easily seen to be unbounded on X . As a consequence, obtaining a worst-case bound will in general require additional assumptions on the reward functions and the decision set X . This will be investigated in detail in Section 3.
Corollary 7 Suppose that γ(r) ≥ C r 1+κ , ∀ r ≥ 0 for some C > 0 and κ > 0. Then
In particular, if u t * ≤ M for all t and η t = η t −β , then
Assuming h is bounded, optimizing over β yields a rate of R t (x) = O(t κ 1+κ ). In particular, if γ(r) = K 2 r 2 , which corresponds to the classic definition of strong convexity, then R t (x) = O( √ t). For non-vanishing u τ we will need that η t 0 for the sum in (11) to converge. Thus we could get potentially tighter control over the rate of this term for κ < 1, at the expense of larger constants.
Online Optimization on Compact Metric Spaces with Uniformly Continuous Rewards
Motivated by Example 2, in this section we apply our results to the problem of regret minimization on compact metric spaces under the additional assumption of uniformly continuous reward functions. Importantly, we make no assumptions on convexity of either the feasible set or the reward functions. Essentially, this can be seen as lifting the non-convex problem of minimizing a sequence of functions over the (possibly non-convex) set S to the convex (albeit infinite-dimensional) problem of minimizing a sequence of linear functionals over the convex subset X of probability measures over the vector space of measures on S. This correspondance is illustrated in Figure 1 .
An Upper Bound on the Worst-Case Regret
Let (S, d) be a compact metric space, and let µ be a Borel measure on S. Suppose that the reward vectors u τ are given by elements in L q (S, µ), where q > 1. Let X = L p (S, µ), where p and q are Hölder conjugates, i.e., 1 p + 1 q = 1. Consider X = {x ∈ X : x ≥ 0 a.e., x 1 = 1}, the set of probability measures on S that are absolutely continuous w.r.t. to µ with p-integrable RadonNikodym derivatives. Moreover, denote by Z the class of non-decreasing χ : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞] such that lim r→0 χ(r) = χ(0) = 0. The following assumption will be made throughout this section: Theorem 8 (Dual Averaging Regret on Metric Spaces with Uniformly Continuous Rewards) Let (S, d) be compact, and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let h be a uniformly essentially strongly convex regularizer on X with modulus γ, and let (η t ) t≥1 be a positive non-increasing sequence of learning rates. Then, under (9), for any positive sequence (ϑ t ) t≥1 ,
Remark 9 The sequence (ϑ t ) t≥1 that appears in Theorem 8 is not a parameter of the Dual Averaging algorithm, but rather a parameter in the regret bound. In particular, (13) holds true for any such positive sequence, and we will use this fact later on to obtain explicit bounds by instantiating (13) with a particular choice of (ϑ t ) t≥1 .
It is important to realize that the infimum over B(s, ϑ t ) in (13) may be infinite, in which case the bound is meaningless. This happens for example if s is an isolated point of a compact subset S ⊂ R n and µ is the Lebesgue measure, in which case B(s, ϑ t ) = ∅. However, under an additional regularity assumption on the measure µ we can avoid such degenerate situations.
Definition 10 (Q-regularity (Heinonen. et al., 2015) 
We say that µ is r 0 -locally Q-regular if (14) holds for all 0 < r ≤ r 0 .
Intuitively, under an r 0 -locally Q-regular measure, the mass in the neighborhood of any point of S is uniformly bounded from above and below. This will allow, at each iteration t, to assign sufficient probability mass around the maximizer(s) of the cumulative reward function.
Example 3 (Regularity of the Lebesgue measure λ) The canonical example for a Q-regular measure is the Lebesgue measure λ on R n . If d is the metric induced by the standard Euclidean norm, then Q = n and the bound (14) is tight with c 0 = C 0 , a dimensional constant. However, for general sets S ⊂ R n , λ need not be locally Q-regular. This is for example the case if S includes isolated points. One sufficient condition for local regularity of the Lebesgue measure is that S is v-uniformly fat, as defined by Krichene et al. (2015) , i.e., that for all s ∈ S, there exists a convex set K ⊆ S that contains s with λ(K) ≥ v. In this case one can to prove that λ| S is r 0 -locally n-regular, with r 0 , c 0 and C 0 depending on the geometry of S. Importantly, S need not be convex or even connected.
Assumption 2 The measure µ is r 0 -locally Q-regular on (S, d).
Recall that he worst-case regret R t is defined as the supremum of R t (x) over all elements of X . In the setting of this section, we can in fact say more:
Proposition 11 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then
Under Assumption 2, B(s, ϑ t ) = ∅ for all s ∈ S and ϑ t > 0, and hence there is hope for a bound on inf x∈B(s,ϑt) h(x) that is uniform in s. To get explicit rates of convergence, we have to consider a more specific class of regularizers.
Explicit Rates for f -Divergences on L p (S)
In this section we consider a particular class of regularizers called f -divergences or Csiszár divergences (Csiszár, 1967) and provide explicit bounds on the worst-case regret. Following Audibert et al. (2014) , we define ω-potentials and the associated f -divergence.
and the f φ -divergence, defined by
where ι X is the indicator function of
A remarkable fact is that for regularizers based on ω potentials, the Dual Averaging update (9) can be computed efficiently. More precisely, it can be shown (Krichene and Balandat, 2016 ) that the maximizer in this case has a simple expression in terms of the dual problem, and the problem of computing x t+1 = Dh * (η t t τ =1 u τ ) reduces to computing a scalar dual variable ν * t . In Proposition 34 in Appendix C we provide a bound on ν * t+1 that depends on the value of ν * t and other parameters of the problem. In practice, these bounds greatly speed up computation.
Note that the measure µ plays the role of a design variable, and its choice will affect our bounds through the constants Q, C 0 and c 0 . The problem of finding a "good" measure µ is a very interesting problem for future studies. For now we will assume that µ(S) = 1, which due to compactness of S is without loss of generality if we want arbitrarily small balls to have finite measure.
Proposition 13 Suppose that µ(S) = 1, and that Assumption 2 holds with constants r 0 > 0 and 0 < c 0 ≤ C 0 < ∞. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 8, with h = h φ the regularizer associated to an ω-potential φ, we have that, for any positive sequence (ϑ t ) t≥1 with ϑ t ≤ r 0 ,
For particular choices of the learning rates (η t ) t≥1 and the sequence (ϑ t ) t≥1 , we can derive explicit regret rates. To intuit, suppose for simplicity that the reward functions are uniformly bounded in the dual norm. Then it is clear that in order for the last term in (16) to vanish asymptotically, η t must be vanishing. Similarly, for the second term to vanish, ϑ t must be vanishing as well. Thus, if both (η t ) t≥1 and (ϑ t ) t≥1 are decreasing sequences, their respective rates of decay must be carefully chosen so that the first term also vanishes. These tradeoffs will become clear in the statement of Corollary 14 and in the numerical examples presented in Appendix D.
Analysis for Entropy Dual Averaging (The Generalized Hedge Algorithm)
Taking φ(z) = e z−1 , we have that f φ (x) = x 1 φ −1 (z)dz = x log x, and hence the regularizer is
. This corresponds to a generalized version of the Hedge algorithm (Arora et al., 2012; Krichene et al., 2015) . The regularizer h φ can be shown to be essentially strongly convex with modulus γ(r) = 1 2 r 2 .
Corollary 14 (Regret Bound for Entropy Dual Averaging) Suppose that µ(S) = 1, that µ is r 0 -locally Q-regular with constants c 0 , C 0 , that u t * ≤ M for all t, and that χ(r) = C α r α for 0 < α ≤ 1 (that is, the rewards are α-Hölder continuous). Then, under Entropy Dual Averaging, choosing η t = η log t/t with η =
1/2 and ϑ > 0, we have that
whenever log t/t < r α 0 ϑ −1 .
One can further optimize over the choice of ϑ to obtain the best constant in the bound. Note also that the case α = 1 corresponds to Lipschitz continuity.
A General Lower Bound
We also prove the following general lower bound for any online algorithm:
Theorem 15 (General Lower Bound) Let (S, d) be compact, suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and let χ ∈ Z. Then for any online algorithm, there exist a sequence (u τ ) t τ =1 of reward vectors u τ ∈ X * with u τ * ≤ M and modulus of continuity χ τ < χ such that
where w : R → R is any function with modulus of continuity χ such that w(d( · , s )) q ≤ M for some s ∈ S for which there exists s ∈ S with d(s, s ) = D S .
Maximizing the constant in (18) is of interest in order to benchmark the bound against the upper bounds obtained in the previous sections. This problem is however quite challenging, and we will defer this analysis to future work. For Hölder-continuous functions, we have the following result:
Proposition 16 (General Lower Bound for Hölder-Continuous Functions) In the setting of Theorem 15, suppose that µ(S) = 1 and that χ(r) = C α r α for some 0 < α ≤ 1. Then
Observe that, up to a √ log t factor, the asymptotic rate of this general lower bound for any online algorithm matches that of the upper bound (17) of Entropy Dual Averaging.
Consistency of Dual Averaging
It is quite intuitive to see that Dual Averaging would recover the greedy algorithm as the regularizer h "approaches a constant". In the following, we make this intuition precise.
Definition 17 (Consistency of a Sequence of Regularizers)
Proposition 18 Suppose Assumption 2 holds and that (h i ) i≥1 is a sequence of regularizers that is consistent. Fix t and let U * := max s∈S U t (s) and S * := {s ∈ S :
Proposition 18 shows that if the sequence of regularizers is consistent, the optimizers, in the limit, collapse to distributions supported on the set of maximizers of U t (as illustrated numerically in Example 5 in Appendix D). If the maximizer of U t is unique, we can say the following:
Corollary 19 In the setting of Proposition 18, suppose that U t admits a unique maximizer s * t ∈ S. Then x * i weakly converges to the Dirac measure on s * t as i → ∞. We write
Learning in Continuous Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
In this section we apply our esults on Dual Averaging on L p -spaces in the context of repeated play of continuous games. In particular, we focus on continuous two-player zero-sum games. In the finite case similar results exist for non-zero sum games, and we believe that they can be extended to our setting, however this is outside the scope of this article (see for example (Stoltz and Lugosi, 2007) for related work on learning correlated equilibria under additional convexity assumptions).
Static Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Consider a two-player zero sum game G = (S 1 , S 2 , u), in which the strategy spaces S 1 and S 2 of player 1 and 2, respectively, are Hausdorff spaces, and u : S 1 × S 2 → R is the payoff function of player 1. As the game is zero-sum, the payoff function of player 2 is −u. For each i, denote by P i := P(S i ) the set of Borel probability measures on S i . Denote S := S 1 × S 2 and P := P 1 × P 2 . For a (joint) mixed strategy x ∈ P, we define the natural extensionū :
, which is the expected payoff of player 1 under x. A continuous zero-sum game G is said to have value V if
The elements x 1 × x 2 ∈ P at which (20) holds are the (mixed) Nash Equilibria of G. We denote the set of Nash equilibria of G by N (G). In the case of finite games, it is well known that every twoplayer zero-sum game has a value. This is not true in general for continuous games, and additional conditions on strategy sets and payoffs are required. A classic result is the following:
Theorem 20 (Glicksberg, 1950) Let S 1 and S 2 be compact, and suppose that u : S 1 × S 2 → R is semi-continuous (upper or lower). Then G has a value.
Repeated Play
We consider repeated play of the continuous two-player zero-sum game. Given a game G and a sequence of plays (s 1 t ) t≥1 and (s 2 t ) t≥1 , we say that player i has sublinear (realized) regret if
where we use −i to denote the other player (e.g. −1 = 2). A strategy σ i for player i is, loosely speaking, a (possibly random) mapping from past observations to its actions. Of primary interest to us are Hannan-consistent strategies (Hannan, 1957) :
Definition 21 (Hannan Consistency) A strategy σ i of player i is Hannan consistent if, for any sequence (s t −i ) t≥1 , the sequence of plays (s t i ) t≥1 generated by σ i has sublinear regret almost surely.
Note that the almost sure statement in Definition 21 is with respect to the randomness in the strategy σ i . The following results are generalizations of their counterparts for discrete games:
Proposition 22 Suppose G has value V and consider a sequence of plays (s 1 t ) t≥1 , (s 2 t ) t≥1 and suppose that player 1 has sublinear realized regret. Then
Corollary 23 Suppose G has value V and consider a sequence of plays (s 1
As in the discrete case (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) , we can also say something about convergence of the empirical distributions of play to the set of Nash Equilibria. Since these distributions have finite support for every t, we can at best hope for convergence in the weak sense as follows:
Theorem 24 (Weak Convergence of the Empirical Distributions of Play) Suppose that in a repeated two-player zero sum game G that has a value both players follow a Hannan-consistent strategy, and denote byx i t = 1 t t τ =1 δ s i τ the marginal empirical distribution of play of player i at iteration t. Letx t := (x 1 t ,x 2 t ). Thenx t N (G) almost surely, that is, with probability 1 the sequence (x t ) t≥1 weakly converges to the set of Nash equilibria of G.
Corollary 25 If G has a unique Nash equilibrium x * , then with probability 1,x t x * .
Hannan-Consistent Strategies
By Theorem 24, if each player follows a Hannan-consistent strategy, then the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. But do such strategies exist? Regret minimizing strategies are intuitive candidates, and the intimate connection between regret minimization and learning in games is well studied for special cases such as for finite games (CesaBianchi and Lugosi, 2006) or potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Using our results from Section 3, we will show that, under an additional assumption on the underlying information structure, no-regret learning based on Dual Averaging leads to Hannan consistency in our setting. Suppose that after each iteration t, each player i observes a partial payoff functionũ i t : S i → R describing their payoff as a function of only their own action, s i , holding the action played by the other player fixed. That is,
Remark 26 Note that we do not assume that the players have knowledge of the the joint utility function u. However, we do assume that the player has full information feedback, in the sense that they observe partial reward functions u( · , s −i τ ) on their entire action set, as opposed to only observing the reward u(s 1 τ , s 2 τ ) of the action played (the latter corresponds to the bandit setting).
We denote byŨ i t = {ũ i τ } t τ =1 the sequence of partial payoff functions observed by player i. We use U i t to denote the set of all possible such histories, and define U i 0 := ∅. A strategy σ i of player i is a collection {σ i t } ∞ t=1 of (possibly random) mappings σ i t :
. We make the following assumption on the payoff function: Assumption 3 The payoff function u is uniformly continuous in s i with modulus of continuity independent of s −i for i = 1, 2. That is, for each i there exists χ i ∈ Z such that |u(s,
It is easy to see that Assumption 3 implies that the game has a value (see e.g. the argument in the proof of Lemma 39). It also makes our setting compatible with that of our Dual Averaging algorithm from Section 3. Suppose therefore that each player randomizes their play according to the sequence of probability distributions on S i generated by Dual Averaging with regularizer h i . That is, suppose that for i ∈ {1, 2}, σ i t is a random variable with the following distribution:
Theorem 27 Suppose that player i uses strategy σ i according to (25) . If the Dual Averaging algorithm ensures sublinear regret (i.e. lim sup t R t /t ≤ 0), then σ i is Hannan-consistent.
Corollary 28 If both players use strategies according to (25) with the respective Dual Averaging ensuring that lim sup t R t /t ≤ 0, then with probability 1 the sequence (x t ) t≥1 of empirical distributions of play weakly converges to the set of Nash equilibria of G.
Interestingly, even though Dual Averaging is performed on L p (S i ), a strict subset of P(S i ), Corollary 28 still ensures weak convergence of the empirical distributions of play to N (G).
Examples

A Game With Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Consider the zero-sum game G 1 between two players playing on the unit interval S i = [0, 1] with payoff function given by
Since |D s i u| ≤ 8 for any s −i ∈ [0, 1] the payoff function is Lipschitz. It can be shown that V = 4/π and that this game has no pure and a unique mixed Nash equilibrium, with equilibrium density
the same for both players (Glicksberg and Gross, 1953) . Note that x i is unbounded and that x i ∈ L p (S i , λ) for any 1 ≤ p < 2. This unboundedness is the reason for the slow convergence of the empirical distributions to x i near zero that we can observe in Figure 2 . 
A Game With Explicit Dual Averaging Updates
Consider a zero-sum game G 2 between two players on the unit interval with payoff function
where a 1 = e−2 e−1 and a 2 = 1 e−1 . It is easy to verify that the pair (x 1 , x 2 ) given by x 1 (s) = exp(s)
e−1 and
is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of G 2 . For sequences (s 1 τ ) t τ =1 and (s 2 τ ) t τ =1 , the cumulative payoff functions for fixed action s ∈ [0, 1] are given, respectively, by
If each player i uses the Generalized Hedge Algorithm with a sequence of learning rates (η τ ) t τ =1
to minimize their respective regret, then their strategy in period t is given by sampling from the distribution x i t (s) ∝ exp(α i t s), where α 1 t = η t Σ t τ =1 s 2 τ − a 1 t and α 2 t = η t a 1 t − Σ t τ =1 s 1 τ . Interestingly, in this case the sum of the opponent's past plays is a sufficient statistic, in the sense that it completely determines the mixed strategy at time t. Figure 3 shows normalized histograms of the empirical distributions of play at different iterations t. As t grows the histograms approach the equilibrium densities x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Note however, that this does not mean that the individual strategies x i t converge. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that the parameters α i t keep oscillating around the equilibrium parameters 1 and −1, respectively, even for very large t. We do, however, observe that the time-averaged parametersᾱ i t converge to the equilibrium values 1 and −1. 
A Game on a Non-Convex Domain
One of the most interesting features of the Dual Averaging algorithms discussed in Section 3 is that they are applicable also in case of non-convex domains. We may therefore utilize them as a tool to compute approximate Nash equilibria in continuous zero-sum games on non-convex domains. In particular, consider a game G 3 in which each
It is easy to see that the Lebesgue measure on this set is Q-regular with Q = 2, c 0 = π 4 and C 0 = π. We define the metricd on S 1 between any two points a, b ∈ S i as the length (in the Euclidean distance) of the shortest path between a and b that is entirely contained in S i . The payoff function u is given as u(s 1 , s 2 ) =d(s 1 , s 2 ) − 1 10d (s 1 , 0), which can be interpreted as a "hide and seek" game in which player 1 would like to get as far away from player 2 as possible, while at the same time having a preference for being near the origin. Player 2 instead wants to be as close to player 1 as possible. Intuitively, this game will not admit a pure Nash equilibrium. Given the geometry of the problem, computing a mixed Nash equilibrium (whose existence follows from Theorem 20) poses a challenge. Instead, having both players play Entropy Dual Averaging on L p (S i , λ), we observe in Figure 5 that they indeed incur sublinear regret, and that the empirical distributions of play do converge. Figure 6 shows Kernel Density Estimates (KDE) ofx 1 t andx 2 t after t = 7500 iterations.
10 0 10 1 10 2 10 3 10 4 t 10 -2 10 -1 10 0 R t /t R t /t player 1 R t /t player 2 
Appendix A. Review of Some Results From Convex Analysis
In this section we collect some results from infinite-dimensional convex analysis that will play an important role in our analysis of the Dual Averaging algorithm.
Lemma 29 (Asplund, 1968) Let f : X → (−∞, +∞] be proper lower semicontinuous. For a pair (x 0 , ξ 0 ) ∈ X × X * the following are equivalent:
(i) f * is finite and Fréchet differentiable at ξ 0 with Fréchet derivative Df
and f * (ξ 0 ) ∈ R.
(iii) For some γ ∈ Γ U ,
and f (x 0 ) ∈ R.
(iv) f * is finite at ξ 0 , dom f * is radial at ξ 0 , and x j → x 0 in norm whenever
Any of the above conditions implies that x 0 , ξ 0 = f (x 0 ) + f * (ξ 0 ) (in other words: the Fenchel-Young inequality holds with equality) and that f (x 0 ) = f * * (x 0 ). The functions γ and γ * in (ii) and (iii) form a pair of mutually dual functions.
Note that the function f in Lemma 29 need not be convex. The following result will be essential to our analysis:
Theorem 30 (Strömberg, 2011) Let f : X → (−∞, +∞] be lower semicontinuous. Then f * is proper and essentially Fréchet differentiable if and only if f is a convex proper function that is essentially strongly convex.
Appendix B. Dual Averaging in Continuous Time
In this section we use ideas from Kwon and Mertikopoulos (2014) and introduce a continuous-time regret minimization problem related to the one in discrete-time discussed in Section 2.2. In fact, this analysis will be crucial in proving the discrete-time regret bound (9) in Theorem 6.
B.1. Regret Minimization in Continuous Time on Reflexive Banach Spaces
Consider a reflexive Banach space X with dual X * and regularizer h on X . Furthermore, suppose that u c : [0, ∞) → X * is a continuous-time reward process satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption 4 The reward process u c is locally integrable for any x ∈ X. That is, for all x ∈ X, r x : t → u c t , x is Lebesgue-integrable on any compact set K ⊂ [0, ∞).
Assumption 5 There exists M < ∞ such that sup x∈X | u Assume for now that 
B.2. Online Optimization in Continuous Time on Compact Metric Spaces
One can also obtain bounds on the regret in continuous time by using similar arguments as in Section 3. While we do not make use of them in the main part of this article, these bounds may be of independent interest.
We consider the setting of Section 3. Specifically, let (S, d) be a compact metric space, and let µ ∈ P, the set of Borel measures on S. Denote by B(s, r) = {s ∈ S : d(s, s ) < r} the open ball of radius r centered at s. For p > 1 consider X = L p (S, µ) and X = {x ∈ X : x ≥ 0 a.e., x 1 = 1}, the set of probability measures on S that are absolutely continuous w.r.t. to µ and whose Radon-Nikodym densities are p-integrable. Proposition 33 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds with constants c 0 > 0 and C 0 < ∞. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 32, with essentially strongly convex regularizer h φ the f -divergence of an ω-potential φ, we have the following regret bound:
Proof [Proposition 33] Similar to the proof of Proposition 13.
Appendix C. Computing the Dual Averaging Optimizer
In this section we discuss some aspects concerning the computation of the optimizer in the Dual Averaging update in the setting of online optimization on compact metric spaces with uniformly continuous rewards. The results of this section are used for generating the Hannan-consistent strategies in the repeated games in Section 5, and for performing the numerical benchmarks of the algorithms in Appendix D.
As pointed out in Section 3.2, it can be shown that for f -Divergences of ω-potentials, the Fréchet differential Dh * in this case has a simple expression in terms of the dual problem, and the problem of computing
Proposition 34 (Krichene and Balandat, 2016) Let φ be an ω-potential with associated f -Divergence h φ on X . Then
where ( · ) + denotes the positive part of ( · ), and ν satisfies S φ(ξ + ν ) + dµ(s) = 1.
By Proposition 34, the Fréchet derivative Dh * φ at ξ = η t U t is entirely determined by the dual variable ν , the unique ν such that f (ν) = 1, where f (ν) = S φ(η t (U t (s) + ν )) + dµ(s). Since f is increasing by assumption on φ, ν can be determined using a simple bisection method. To guide the search for ν t for t > 0 we can make use of the following result:
Proposition 35 Suppose φ is convex and let ν t the optimal dual variable determining Dh * φ (η t U t ). Then
where ν 0 = η
If φ is convex, then so is φ( · ) + as z → z + is convex and nondecreasing. Therefore
and hence, since φ ≥ 0, we must have that η t+1 ν t+1 − η t ν t + η t+1 M ≥ 0. Rearranging yields the lower bound on ν t+1 . The other inequality is proven in a similar fashion by reversing the roles of t and t+1. Finally, to show that the interval has length ≈ (1 + β)M independent of t, note that
and so
Having determined ν t , we then have an explicit form of the distribution over S from which to sample s t+1 . For this, a variety of established methods can be used, from simple rejection sampling in low dimensions (employed in our simulations) to MCMC methods (e.g. slice sampling) in higher dimensions. In cetain special cases, sampling from x t may be done very efficiently. For example, if the losses are affine, the domain S is a hyperrectangle, and the potential is a generalized Exponential Potential, then s t+1 can be obtained by sampling from n independent truncated exponential random variables. The main computational challenge is then to compute the integral in f . Off-the-shelf numerical integration schemes work well if n is small, but are typically not applicable in higher dimensions. Instead, one has to resort to other methods, such as Monte Carlo methods or sparse grids.
Appendix D. Numerical Results and Comparison With Other Methods
In this section, we review some algorithms for online convex optimization over subsets of R n that have been proposed in the literature, and compare them with our Dual Averaging method for online optimization on compact metric spaces with uniformly continuous rewards from Section 3. Such algorithms are often formulated in terms of loss functions τ , but clearly these algorithms apply just as well by setting τ = −u τ , as long as the set S is convex and the rewards are concave and satisfy the additional assumptions made by the algorithms. Table 1 summarizes the regret bounds of each method, with the corresponding assumptions on the feasible set and the loss functions.
The bound on Dual Averaging in Table 1 is obtained by assuming the regularizer to be the f -divergence associated to an ω-potential and making an assumption on the asymptotic growth rate of the function f φ as follows:
1+κ for some κ > 0 and C φ < ∞. Suppose further the rewards are α-Hölder continuous, i.e. χ(r) = C α r α , and that h φ is uniformly essentially strongly convex with modulus γ(r) = Zinkevich (2003) formalized the online convex optimization problem, in which the feasible set S and the loss functions are assumed to be convex. He proposed a Greedy Projection method (GP), summarized in Algorithm 1, which we will also refer to as Online Gradient Descent (OGD). Theorem 1 in (Zinkevich, 2003) shows that when ∇ t is uniformly bounded, the regret of GP with learning rates η t = 1/ √ t grows as O( √ t). Hazan et al. (2007) show that it is possible to obtain logarithmic regret under additional assumptions on the loss functions. In particular, if the losses are H-strongly convex then GP with learning rates η t = (1 + log t). They also propose methods for uniformly exp-concave losses, that is, when there exists α > 0 such that exp(−α t ) is concave for all t. These methods, Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization (EWOO) and Follow The Approximate Leader (FTAL), are summarized in Algorithm 2 and 3 (their Online Newton Step (ONS) algorithm is very similar to FTAL and and therefore omitted). The respective regret bounds are given in Theorems 4 and 7 in (Hazan et al., 2007) and are summarized in Table 1 .
Algorithm 1 Greedy Projection method (GP) a.k.a.
Online Gradient Descent (OGD), with input sequence ( t ) and learning rates (η t ) 1: for t ∈ N do 2:
Update: x t+1 = δ s t+1 , where
Algorithm 2 Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization method (EWOO), with input sequence ( t ) and learning rate α.
Algorithm 3 Follow The Approximate Leader (FTAL) with input sequence ( t ) and parameter β.
and define s At = s, A t s .
4:
Algorithm 4 Dual Averaging (DA) with input sequence (u t ), learning rates (η t ), and regularizer h.
Example 4 (Convex Quadratics on a Hypercube) As a first example, we consider quadratic reward functions of the form u t (s) = − 1 2 (s − µ t ) T Q t (s − µ t ) − c t , where Q t is p.d. symmetric, and c t ≥ 0. The domain is S = { s ∞ ≤ 0.5} with D S = √ n, and the rewards are generated randomly, L-Lipschitz with L = 5 and uniformly bounded by u t ∞ ≤ 3.75 and u t 4 ≤ 1.6. Figure 7 shows the time-average regrets R t /t in dimensions n = 2 and n = 3 for time horizons of T = 10 4 and T = 4 · 10 3 , respectively. Displayed are the empirical means over N = 2500 runs of the algorithm (solid), the associated theoretical bounds 1 (dashed), and the regions between the associated 10% and 90% quantiles (shaded).
Not surprisingly, those algorithms that exploit the strong convexity of the problem (OGD, FTAL, EWOO) achieve better asymptotic rates than GP (which requires only convexity) or DA (which makes no convexity assumptions at all). Still, the regret of DA is not significantly higher than that of GP and OGD, and is competitive with FTAL over the simulation horizon. We note that the theoretical regret bounds for both DA instances are much closer to the actual regret of the algorithm. Table 2 shows the decay rates (which correspond to the slopes in the log-log plots) of empirical means and theoretical bounds in Figure 7 at the end of the simulation horizon. There is a relatively good match between bounds and simulations. Except for FTAL and EWOO, all algorithms exhibit a decay that is faster than that of the associated bound 2 . When making this comparison, one must keep in mind that all these bounds are worst-case in nature, and that it is not entirely clear what characterizes a worst-case sequence of Table 3 : Rates in Figure 8 Example 5 (Alternating Affine Losses on a Hypercube) In this example we consider a situation in which the greedy algorithm mentioned in Section 3 fails 3 , and offer a simulation that illustrates the result of Proposition 18. We consider a sequence of affine reward functions on S = { s ∞ ≤ 0.5} in R 2 , alternating in such a way that any maximizer s t of U t is in fact a minimizer of U t+1 . Specifically, we choose u t (s) = − a t , s − c t , where
for t ≥ 1. It is easy to see that in this case the greedy algorithm incurs time-average regret R t /t = L + o(1). Figure 8 shows regrets for the greedy algorithm and DA with Exponential and different ρ-Norm potentials. Besides the obvious failure of the greedy algorithm, we observe that for p-Norm potentials performance decreases as ρ 1, which can be explained by Proposition 18. Nevertheless, DA guarantees sublinear regret for any ρ > 1 (with theoretical asymptotic rate approaching t −1/2 as ρ → 1), though at the cost of much higher constants in the bound as ρ ≈ 1. Table 3 shows that empirical and theoretical rates in this instance (which is intuitively hard) are very close, providing further support for the theoretical analysis of DA. Finally, Figure 9 for each potential shows the negative entropy D KL (x t ||λ) of x t . From this we observe that the minimizers x [ρ] are indeed more and more concentrated around their mode as ρ 1. Proof [Theorem 8] The space X = L p (S) is uniformly convex (Clarkson, 1936) , and thus reflexive (Milman, 1938) . Its dual is X * = L q (S, µ) for q = p p−1 and x, ξ = S x(s)ξ(s) µ(ds) for x ∈ X and ξ ∈ X * .
Fix t < ∞. Then for any s ∈ S and all x ∈ B(s, ϑ t )
and therefore
and thus (33) follows from (31) in Theorem 31.
Choosing β = 1/2 and ϑ t = ϑ 1 α (log t) 1 2α t − β α this becomes, after dropping a 1/ log t term, 
Using the triangle inequality it is easy to see that v also has modulus of continuity χ. Now observe that
, and consider the (random) sequence of reward vectors (u τ ) t τ =1 with u t = V t v. By Proposition 11 we have that R t = sup x∈P R t (x), and thus
Observe that the second expectation is zero for any sequence of (x τ ) t τ =1 with x τ measurable with respect to σ(V 1 , . . . , V τ −1 ), i.e. any online algorithm. Noting that max(a, b) = 1 2 (a + b) + 1 2 |a − b| we thus have that
where the last step follows from an application of Khintchine's inequality (Haagerup, 1981) .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 16
Lemma 38 Let C ∈ R and 0 < β ≤ 1. The function v : [0, ∞) given by v(r) = Cr β is Hölder continuous with modulus of continuity χ(r) = |C| β r β .
Proof [Lemma 38] Noting that |x + y| β ≤ |x| β + |y| β for any x, y ∈ R we find with x = Cr 1 − Cr 2 and y = Cr 2 for any r 1 , r 2 ≥ 0 that |C|r
Exchanging the roles of r 1 and r 2 then yields Cr
Proof 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 18
Proof [Proposition 18] Fix t < ∞ and let δ > 0. Consider x ∈ X with := (B * δ ) c x(s)µ(ds) > 0. and define the function κ :
Clearly, κ is decreasing, κ(u) < U * for u > 0 by definition of S * , and continuous (by continuity of U t ). We then have that
Clearly,x ∈ X . Furthermore,
Now h i (x) − h i (x) → 0 as i → ∞ by consistency of (h i ) i≥0 . Hence there exists j < ∞ such that ( * ) > 0 and thus x = x * j for all i ≥ j. Since was arbitrary, this shows that (B * δ ) c x * i (s) µ(ds) → 0 as i → ∞.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 19
Proof [Corollary 19] Let f : S → R be continuous and bounded, say |f (s)| ≤ M for all s ∈ S. Let > 0. Since S is compact, f is uniformly continuous, i.e. ∃ δ > 0 such that |f (s) − f (s * )| < /2 for all s ∈ B * δ . By Corollary 18 there exists j < ∞ such that x * i ((B * δ ) c ) < 4M for all i > j. Hence 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 22
PROOF OF THEOREM 24
In the proof of the theorem we will use the following Lemma:
Lemma 39 The functions g 1 (x 2 ) := sup x 1 ∈P1ū (x 1 , x 2 ) and g 2 (x 1 ) := inf x 2 ∈P2ū (x 1 , x 2 ) are continuous with respect to the weak topology. ∞) ) are open, since the sets of the form (−∞, a) and (b, ∞) form a subbase for the topology of R. Observe first that u is continuous. Indeed, by Assumption 3, we have for any s, t ∈ S 1 × S 2 that and so for any > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that |u(s 1 , s 2 ) − u(t 1 , t 2 )| < whenever (d 1 × d 2 )(s, t) < δ. Since u is continuous on the compact set S 1 × S 2 it is bounded, i.e. there exists M < ∞ such that |u(s 1 , s 2 )| ≤ M for all s ∈ S. This implies thatū(x 1 , x 2 ) is 2M -Lipschitz w.r.t the Lévy-Prokhorov metric Combining the last inequality with (43) proves (42a). The argument for (42b) is essentially the same, modulo some sign changes. This proves that for any realization with sublinear regret for both players, all weak limit points of the sequence (x Proof [Theorem 27] To start, note that for any p > 1 the space X as a closed subset of L p (S, µ) is a complete metric space, hence Polish and thus there exists a Borel isomorphism between X and the Lebesgue measure on the unit interval. Consequently, to randomize its plays according to a sequence of probability measures in X , it suffices that player i has access to a sequence of i.i.d. random variables drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Denote this sequence by Z i = (Z i 1 , Z i 2 , . . . ). The key observation is that if player −i plays a non-oblivious strategy, then the partial rewards will not be some a priori fixed sequence of reward functions, but will depend on the history of play. Indeed, sincẽ u (45) and (44), we have for all t < ∞ that Now R t /t → 0 by assumption, and log(t/ ) t → 0 for any > 0, which proves Hannan consistency.
